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Abstract
This report develops an economic model that provides the theoretical 
framework for the econometric analyses presented in the report’s companion
volume, WIC and the Retail Price of Infant Formula (FANRR-39). The
model examines supermarket retail prices for infant formula in a local market
area, and identifies the theoretical effects of the Special Supplemental
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and its infant
formula rebate program. Special attention is given to the rebate program’s
sole-source procurement system by which a single manufacturer becomes a
State’s “contract brand”—the State’s one supplier of formula to WIC
infants—in exchange for paying rebates to WIC. When a manufacturer’s
brand is designated a State’s contract brand, the model predicts that super-
markets increase that brand’s retail price. The model also predicts that an
increase in the ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-fed infants in a local
market results in an increase in the price of the contract brand and, through
demand substitution, a relatively small price increase for noncontract brands.
Keywords: WIC program, infant formula, cost containment, rebates, food
package costs, Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children, child nutrition, food assistance 
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This report develops an economic model to examine supermarket retail
prices for infant formula in local market areas, and to identify the theoretical
effects of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC) and its infant formula rebate program. The model
adapts a multi-firm Cournot oligopoly model to a new setting that incorpo-
rates two differentiated products: heterogeneous consumers segmented by
income, and the roles of WIC and its rebate program. This report provides
the theoretical framework for the specification and interpretation of the
econometric model presented in the report’s companion volume, WIC and
the Retail Price of Infant Formula (Oliveira et al., 2004).
Using this framework, the influence of WIC in a local market area is meas-
ured by the relative size of WIC, defined as the ratio of WIC to non-WIC
formula-fed infants. While non-WIC consumers are sensitive to the price of
formula, WIC households are not price sensitive because they do not pay for
formula out of pocket. Holding other factors constant, the model predicts
that as the relative size of WIC increases, retailers increase infant formula
retail prices. The model also predicts that retail prices depend on the type of
contract used by the WIC State agency to procure infant formula. Currently,
WIC State agencies use competitive bidding to award a contract to a single
manufacturer of infant formula for the exclusive right to provide its product
to WIC participants in the State. Under sole-source or exclusive-rights
procurement, all of the WIC demand is channeled to the formula provided
by the contract-winning manufacturer and none of the WIC demand goes to
other national brands. When the retail price of the formula made by the
contract-holding manufacturer increases due to an increase in the relative
size of WIC, some non-WIC households respond by switching to other
infant formula brands. The retail prices of these other infant formula brands
increase as a result, although by a smaller amount than the initial price
increase of the contract-holding manufacturer’s formula. 
The report also examines how retail prices can be affected by different types
of distribution systems; socioeconomic factors; the degree of competition
faced by the supermarket sector (inclusive of all supermarkets) due to the
presence of discount stores; the degree of competition faced by a super-
market chain (which may own one or more stores) due to the presence of
other supermarket chains; and a formula manufacturer’s wholesale cost. The
model focuses on the retail markup, treating manufacturers’ wholesale
prices for infant formula as exogenous. 
iii
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This report develops an economic model (the “WIC model”) that examines
supermarket retail prices for infant formula in a local market area, and iden-
tifies the theoretical effects of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program
for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) and its infant formula rebate
program (hereafter, “rebate program”). The foundation of the WIC model is
a multi-firm Cournot oligopoly model, but the WIC model generalizes the
Cournot model to a new setting. The WIC model features two differentiated
products, heterogeneous consumers that are segmented by income, and the
roles of WIC and its rebate program. The WIC model provides the theoret-
ical framework for the specification and interpretation of the econometric
model presented in this report’s companion volume WIC and the Retail
Price of Infant Formula (Oliveira et al., 2004).
This chapter describes background information on WIC and the rebate
program. Chapter 2 presents the WIC model’s assumptions and mathematical
structure, and the model’s solution is derived in Chapter 3. A central variable
of the WIC model that captures the importance of WIC in a local market area
is the relative size of WIC, measured by the ratio of WIC to non-WIC
formula-fed infants. Chapter 4 uses the model to determine the theoretical
effect on retail prices due to changes in the relative size of WIC and other
WIC-related factors.1 The WIC-related factors that are considered are:
• the presence of the WIC program (without rebates) relative to the
absence of the WIC program;
• an increase in the relative size of WIC (without rebates);
• an increase in the relative size of WIC if WIC has rebates generated by
open market contracts;
• the use of open market contracts relative to the absence of any rebate
contracts;
• an increase in the relative size of WIC if WIC has rebates generated by
sole-source contracts;
• the use of sole-source contracts relative to the use of open market
contracts;
• the use of sole-source contracts relative to the absence of the WIC
program; and
• the use of home delivery or direct distribution relative to the use of the
retail food delivery system for distribution of WIC formula.
WIC safeguards the health of low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and post-
partum women, infants, and children up to age 5 who are at nutritional risk,
by providing a package of supplemental foods, nutrition education, and
health care referrals. Although WIC encourages mothers to breastfeed, a
majority of participating infants receives infant formula through WIC. In the
mid-1980s, infant formula accounted for nearly 40 percent of total WIC
food costs, and infant formula retail prices were rising more quickly than
prices for other foods. These factors led Tennessee and other States to look
into cost containment practices to reduce infant formula costs. Tennessee
1
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1The WIC model resembles nearly
all other economic models in that it
does not generate predictions of the
magnitudes of price effects, but
instead yields theoretical predictions
of the direction—rise or fall—of price
effects that result from changes in 
economic, demographic, and policy
factors. The empirical analyses in the
companion volume are designed to
estimate the magnitudes of price
effects.initiated a rebate contract system in 1987. In 1989, P.L. 100-147 required
States to use competitive bidding—or an alternate method that would yield
savings equal to or greater than those produced by competitive bidding—to
procure infant formula. Indian State agencies with 1,000 or fewer WIC
participants are exempt from this requirement. 
Currently, WIC State agencies use competitive bidding to award a contract
to a single manufacturer of infant formula for the exclusive right to provide
its product to WIC participants in the State. The contract-winning manufac-
turer is then billed for the amount of the rebates on the formula issued to
WIC participants. During the 1994-2000 study period covered by the empir-
ical analyses in Oliveira et al., four manufacturers held one or more WIC
State contracts (for at least part of the study period): Mead-Johnson, Ross,
Carnation, and Wyeth. In fiscal year 2000, infant formula rebates totaled
$1.4 billion, an amount that supported 27 percent of WIC participants
(USDA, 2001).
WIC is an influential agent in the infant formula market: ERS estimates that
infants participating in WIC consume about 54 percent of all formula sold
in the United States. In most States, WIC participants use food vouchers or
food checks to purchase their infant formula, free of charge, at participating
retail grocery stores. WIC then reimburses the retail grocery stores for the
amount of infant formula purchased. Some observers have hypothesized that
WIC and its rebate program may significantly affect the retail infant formula
prices faced by non-WIC consumers, either indirectly, through their impact
on wholesale prices, or directly, through their effect on the retail markup
(the difference between the retail price and the wholesale price). The WIC
model focuses on the retail markup, with the model’s structure and language
developed to analyze supermarket pricing decisions. The manufacturers’
wholesale prices for infant formula are exogeneous in the model. 
The WIC model focuses on supermarket infant formula retail prices as
opposed to prices established by other retailers because the price data
analyzed in Oliveira et al. are obtained from supermarket surveys. The
retail price data cover many major U.S. market areas for the study period
1994-2000 and are used, in part, for price regressions for the separate
national brands of each of the major manufacturers selling formula as of
September 2000. 
In principle, WIC-related factors that could affect retail prices in a local
market area—for any given levels of manufacturers’ wholesale prices—
include:
• the relative size of WIC 
• the presence of a WIC rebate contract, and the type of contract (i.e.,
whether the contract is a sole-source contract or an open market
contract)
• the delivery system used to provide infant formula to WIC households. 
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mizing supermarkets establish a higher retail price if the relative size of
WIC is larger. Economic reasoning suggests that WIC lowers the price
sensitivity of demand in the infant formula market. WIC provides food
checks or food vouchers (hereafter, “vouchers”) to WIC households, thus
taking a group of (low-income) households that would otherwise be price-
sensitive and enabling them to obtain infant formula without bearing the
retail price themselves. WIC makes these households insensitive to the retail
price, and retail prices are higher when a price-insensitive component of the
local market is larger. In the WIC model it turns out that retail prices are
affected not by the absolute size of the WIC program, as measured by the
number of WIC formula-fed infants, but rather the relative sizes of the WIC
and non-WIC market segments. 
The second set of WIC-related factors listed above concerns the presence
and type of WIC contract. As of September 2000, each of the 50 WIC State
agencies used a single manufacturer as a supplier of formula for WIC
households. In contrast, under an open market contract—a form of contract
that some WIC State agencies used in the early 1990s—any and all infant
formula manufacturers could voluntarily participate in a State’s rebate
program. A participating manufacturer would pay a rebate, chosen by the
manufacturer, when its particular formula was provided to a WIC house-
hold. Under the open market contract, WIC households themselves chose
which brand of formula to obtain and each manufacturer’s national brand
receives at least some of the infant formula demand of WIC households
(hereafter, “WIC demand”). In contrast, under sole-source procurement, the
formula provided by the contract-winning manufacturer receives all of the
WIC demand and all other national brands receive none of the WIC
demand.2 The WIC model predicts that retail prices depend on the type of
contract. Most notably, under a sole-source contract, the prices of the
contract and noncontract brands can be expected to respond differently to a
change in WIC demand.
The bulk of the analysis of the WIC model is devoted to the retail food
delivery system inasmuch as 48 of the 50 States utilized that system during
the study period in Oliveira et al. Under the home distribution system,
which Vermont uses, infant formula is delivered to the WIC participant’s
home. Under the direct distribution system, which Mississippi uses, WIC
participants pick up infant formula from storage facilities operated by a
State or local agency. The WIC model identifies how retail price depends on
the type of delivery system used by a WIC State agency. 
The list of WIC-related factors that may affect the retail prices (for given
wholesale prices) does not include the amount of the rebates (on either a
per-can basis or in total). Infant formula manufacturers—not retailers—bear
the legal incidence for the rebate payments. If a manufacturer increases its
wholesale price in response to its rebate payments or other WIC-related
factors, then retail prices would be affected in turn (assuming retail markups
are unchanged). This economic mechanism is discussed briefly in this
report, but it is excluded from the formal WIC model so that the model can
isolate retailer behavior. Manufacturers’ wholesale prices are included in the
2 An exception to this general state-
ment is that the WIC State agency can
issue formula provided by a different
manufacturer when medical documen-
tation supports the use of another
infant formula product or a noncon-
tract brand of formula is needed for
religious reasons.
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specific regressions for retail prices. 
In addition to its examination of WIC-related factors and the wholesale
price, the WIC model identifies various socioeconomic factors and market-
structure conditions that can affect retail prices in a local market area. These
other factors include median household income; the poverty rate; the degree
of competition faced by the supermarket sector (inclusive of all supermar-
kets) due to the presence of discount stores; and the degree of competition
faced by a supermarket chain (which may own one or more stores) due to
the presence of other supermarket chains.
Oliveira et al. found that, within market areas, there is not a clear and
consistent relationship between a formula’s being the WIC contract brand
and its being sold at the highest average retail price. However, comparing
the retail prices of contract and noncontract brands of formula may not iden-
tify WIC-related price effects since, as just noted, other factors may affect
retail prices too. The WIC model identifies conditions under which, theoret-
ically, the retail price of the contract brand would be higher than the prices
for noncontract brands. It also identifies alternative conditions under which
that expectation would not be met. 
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The WIC model builds on existing economic theory by generalizing the
standard multi-firm single-product Cournot oligopoly model to a new
setting. The WIC model features differentiated brands of formula, heteroge-
neous consumers that are segmented by income, and the roles of WIC and
its rebate program. A key feature of the WIC model’s specification is the
presence of not one but two formula brands (two “products”), a feature that
is required to identify the simultaneous interactions between the prices of
contract and noncontract brands of formula under a sole-source contract. 
The theoretical device of aggregating products or brands into a “composite”
product is common in economic theory. Although there were as many as
four manufacturers in a given market area at some time during the
companion volume’s 1994-2000 study period, a two-brand model is suffi-
cient to capture the basic theoretical interactions between a contract brand
and a single “noncontract brand” which represents an aggregation of all
other (noncontract) brands. 
Basic Assumptions
In the WIC model, the geographic extent of the market corresponds to a
local market area, i.e., retail prices are determined by factors that exist
locally.3 This treatment ignores retail prices prevailing in other market areas
and assumes, reasonably, that households do not travel to any other market
area to obtain formula. So, for example, households in San Diego would not
buy infant formula in Los Angeles. 
Households obtain formula not only from supermarkets, but also from mass
merchandisers and drugstores. Supermarkets are the major source of infant
formula, with 69 percent of infant formula products (in 2000) provided by
supermarkets, while mass merchandisers accounted for about 28 percent and
drugstores for less than 4 percent. For the empirical analysis in Oliveira et
al., data were available for estimating the number of discount stores (such as
Wal-Mart, K-Mart, and Target) that sell infant formula in a market area. The
WIC model and the empirical analysis both include the number of discount
stores (adjusted for population) as a determinant of demand for infant
formula in the supermarket sector. The opportunity for consumers to substi-
tute between supermarkets and discount stores limits the ability of super-
markets to raise their formula prices. 
The supermarket sector is characterized by a set of chains each of which
owns a set of supermarkets (or “stores”) distinguished by geographic loca-
tion. The WIC model treats a chain, rather than an individual supermarket,
as the decisionmaking “firm.”4 It is assumed that the chain establishes a
single price for the one or more supermarkets it owns: price differences
across supermarkets within a chain are ruled out. Although not all supermar-
kets are equally convenient to a representative consumer, it is assumed that a
representative consumer has a choice between various supermarkets
belonging to separate chains in a market area, which limits the ability of
any one chain to raise the price of formula in the supermarkets it owns. 
3 In the empirical implementation
of the WIC model, the geographic
extent of the market corresponds to a
U.S. “market area” as defined by
Information Resources, Inc. (IRI). 
4 Any measure of supermarket
concentration is based on the market
shares of “firms.” To adopt any
measure, a modeling decision must be
made for whether an individual super-
market or a chain constitute the “firm.”
The empirical analysis in Oliveira et al.
uses the shares of chains to measure
concentration, prompted by the notion
that chains “compete” with other
chains but stores within chains do not
economically “compete” with one
another due to their common owner-
ship. (The concentration measure in
Oliveira et al. does include the share of
an individual supermarket if that store
is a so-called “independent.”)
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firms (chains) and is determined as a result of a Nash game in which any
given chain treats the output (quantity of formula) of the other chains as
exogenous when choosing its own output to maximize its profits. All chains
choose their outputs simultaneously.
Previous models of oligopoly suppose either that M firms each produce a
single homogeneous product or that M firms each produce a differentiated
product of which there are M varieties, one for each firm. In either type of
model, each firm has but a single choice variable (either quantity or price)
for its single product. A distinctive feature of the WIC model is that it
contains not one but two brands of infant formula that are offered by each of
the M different supermarket chains.5 A chain must therefore choose two
levels of output—one for each brand—for its supermarkets. Thus, interde-
pendency exists not only between firms, as in the Cournot model, but also
between brands: a chain takes into account the effect on its profits from
brand 1 when it is considering brand 2, and vice versa. The incentive a
chain has to raise or lower its price for any one brand is affected by the
extent to which its customers would substitute to the other brand on the
chain’s own shelf. The interdependency between the two brands’ prices
gives rise to a corresponding interdependency between the WIC model’s
two inter-firm Nash games. 
Cost Factors
The marginal cost to a chain for a unit (can) of formula includes its whole-
sale cost plus the retailing costs of inventory, shelf space, stocking, and
checkout. The wholesale cost is thought to be far larger than retailing costs.
The WIC model allows the two brands to have different marginal costs, c1
and c2 , but assumes that marginal costs do not vary across chains within
local markets. A chain’s total cost function for a brand of infant formula (as
a “stand-alone” product, separate from the chain’s many other products) is
given by:
The wholesale price schedules of infant formula manufacturers incorporate
bulk discounts. Buyers who purchase formula by the truckload (i.e., 40,000-
44,000 pounds) obtain the manufacturer’s lowest wholesale price. For
example, in 2000 (the last year of the study period in Oliveira et al.) Mead-
Johnson charged a truckload price of $2.94 per unit (13-ounce can) for its
milk-based liquid concentrate formula. A chain that bought half that paid a
few pennies more, totaling $2.98 per unit. Thus, in general, a chain’s
marginal cost does in fact depend on the amount purchased, in contrast to
the specification in (1).
Although a chain that bought a single 12-can case of that same formula paid
substantially more—$3.41 per unit—a key feature of the price data exam-
ined in Oliveira et al. prompts the WIC model’s assumption that marginal
cost is the same across chains. The supermarket retail price data are not
chain-specific but instead are averages across a market area’s supermarkets
6
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5 An appendix to the paper defines
all symbols used in the paper, in order
of introduction.
( ) (1)  C 1,2 l, , k,i k,i k k,i qc q k i M == = , Kbased on data from a survey. To be included in the survey a chain had to
have at least $2 million in sales annually (in total for all items in all stores).
Thus, prices charged by local corner grocery stores and others with sales
below that threshold are not included. It was thought the surveyed chains
typically pay the truckload price for formula. For large-scale chains that
purchase by the truckload or more, wholesale prices can indeed be treated
as constant on the margin and identical across such chains. 
Even though the supermarket price data could include prices for medium-
sized chains that pay more than the truckload price, the truckload price can
be a proxy for their wholesale costs. After all, wholesale cost differences
across chains on the order of a few pennies are small relative to the retail
price differences across market areas that the regressions seek to explain.
Furthermore, wholesale prices charged by a manufacturer tend to move
together: changes in the wholesale price paid by the medium-size firms
parallel the changes in the truckload price that was included in the regres-
sion. For these reasons, the regression specification in Oliveira et al.
included a single wholesale price for a brand—the truckload price—thereby
setting aside bulk discounts. Thus, the WIC model’s assumption that a
chain’s marginal cost is constant and equal across chains—at least for the
chains in the price survey—was thought to be reasonable for the WIC
model’s purposes of supporting and coinciding with the regression analysis.
A final issue is whether marginal cost would increase if all chains in a local
market area increase their purchases simultaneously due to an increase in
market demand. Infant formula manufacturers establish national price
schedules, so that the wholesale prices faced by any one local market area
are constant not only at the chain level but for the local market area as well.
Demands of Out-of-Pocket Households
In the market area, there are N households with one infant who is fed infant
formula. Each household is a member of one of three distinct formula-buying
groups or market segments: high-income households (H), low-income non-
WIC households (L), or low-income households that receive vouchers in the
WIC program (W), where H + L + W=  N . It is useful for the income
“cutoff” that divides low-income from high-income households to be set
above the income threshold for WIC income eligibility (185 percent of
poverty) instead of equal to or below that threshold. This assumption means
that, by definition of the term low-income, there is some positive number of
low-income non-WIC households (L > 0) even under full funding for WIC
and full participation by eligible households; otherwise an entire category of
households, L, awkwardly “appears” or “disappears” based on whether or not
WIC has full funding and full participation by eligible households.6
The WIC model contains two brands of infant formula. The pair of brands
will be interpreted two different ways when analyzing sole-source contracts:
• the two brands each represent two different manufacturers’ national
brands in a given market area; 
6 In this framework, the term “low-
income households” refers to the total
L + W, which includes the low-income
households that participate in WIC
(W) and the low-income non-WIC
households (L) who purchase formula
out of pocket.
7
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area, under the alternative conditions of being the contract brand or
being a noncontract brand.
The first interpretation is the most straightforward one. It will be used to
compare the retail price of a national brand (e.g., Carnation) that is the
contract brand in the market area with the retail price of a different national
brand (e.g., Mead-Johnson) that is a noncontract brand in the same market
area;  alternatively, the model’s noncontract brand could represent an aggre-
gation of all noncontract brands. The second interpretation applies to a
particular national brand (e.g., Carnation) as it transitions in a given market
area between being a noncontract brand and being a contract brand. This
second interpretation is adopted to isolate the effects of a change in contract
brand status, holding constant which national brand (and its brand-specific
factors) is examined. Under either interpretation, brand 1 will be treated as
the contract brand and brand 2 as the noncontract brand. 
Per-household demand curves for brands 1 and 2 for supermarket infant
formula purchased by the representative out-of-pocket low- and high-
income households are:
where bj , j = L, H, is an own-price slope term the value of which depends
on the income level of the household, s is a cross-price slope term, u is a
parameter capturing what the model calls the tag-along effect, and a1 and a2
are brand-specific constants. Each of the parameters is considered in turn.
The own-price slope terms bL and bH in (2) reflect how readily the two
groups of out-of-pocket consumers, L and H, substitute away from (towards)
supermarket formula in response to an increase (decrease) in the super-
market price. Substitutes for supermarket formula include home-prepared
formula, the introduction of cow’s milk and/or solid foods into the infant’s
diet at an earlier age, and formula obtained from a discount store. As substi-
tutes become closer, out-of-pocket consumers become more price-sensitive
and the two slope terms become larger (in absolute value). For example, the
greater the presence of discount stores in a local market, the greater the
price sensitivity of supermarket customers to the supermarket price, and the
larger (in absolute value) will be the own-price slope terms slope terms bL
and bH. The relative importance of the various substitutes is not identified;
however, intuition suggests that most households would use discount store
formula rather than, say, switch to home production of formula in response
to a supermarket price increase. 7 The combined strength of all substitution
possibilities is reflected in the magnitudes of bL and bH. 
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7 Another imaginable substitution
behavior in response to an increase in
the supermarket price of infant
formula is for a household to switch
from formula-feeding to breastfeeding.
However, the empirical analysis in
Oliveira et al. treats the household’s
decision to breastfeed or to formula-
feed as exogenous, depending on such
factors as level of education of the
mother, supportiveness of breast-
feeding by the mother’s mother and
other family and friends, social accept-
ance of breastfeeding activities, and
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=− − + =A fundamental aspect of the model’s structure is that out-of-pocket low- and
high-income households differ in their own-price sensitivities, specifically,
that bL > bH.8 Thus, if price rises by a given dollar amount, both types of
households purchase less supermarket formula—but a low-income non-WIC
household is relatively more responsive to the price increase, switching to
substitutes (perhaps especially discount store formula) more readily than
high-income households.9
The cross-price term s shows how readily a household’s reduction in quan-
tity demanded for a brand (in the supermarket sector), due to an increase in
that brand’s (supermarket) price, is retained within the supermarket sector
by an increase in quantity demanded for the substitute brand off the super-
market shelf. For example, if P1 increases then q1,j falls by bj in (2a) and
q2,j rises by s in (2b). It is assumed that only part of the decrease in q1,j is
shifted to q2,j, i.e., that a (representative) household makes some use of
substitutes other than the alternative brand on the supermarket shelf
(perhaps especially formula obtained at a discount store). Mathematically,
this assumption means that bj > s for both out-of-pocket groups. Because
allowing group-specific differences in s does not yield additional insight, s
is assigned the same value for both the high-income and low-income non-
WIC households (unlike the own-price terms bj, which do differ by group).
The assumption that the own-price effect on a brand’s quantity demanded
is larger than the cross-price effect is economically reasonable. This
assumption also allows the model’s mathematical solution to yield positive
prices in equilibrium. 
The introduction of the parameter s into the WIC model makes the model
interesting and powerful. If instead s is omitted from the model by setting 
s = 0, then households exhibit no inter-brand substitution at all and respond
to a brand’s price increase in the supermarket sector by buying the same
brand in the discount store sector (or by making other substitutions). If s = 0,
demands for the two brands are independent and the two-product WIC model
separates into two one-product models, in which case supermarkets would
establish each brand’s price without any particular reference to the other
brand’s price (in the same way supermarkets establish prices for, say, apples
and hairbrushes). Although a strength of the model is that it allows for s to
be positive, it is worth noting that s is not required to be positive either for
solving the theoretical model or for estimating its empirical counterpart,
which estimates statistically from price data whether or not s is positive. 
The non-negative term u is common to the demand functions for both
brands, although it differs in sign: for brand 1 (the contract brand) a posi-
tive u adds to quantity demanded in (2a), while for brand 2 (the noncontract
brand) a positive u diminishes quantity demanded in (2b) by precisely the
same amount. The parameter u represents the combined influence of two
conceptually distinct effects that the model calls a medical promotion effect
and a shelf-space effect. Either of these effects augments demand for the
contract brand at the expense of the noncontract brand under sole-source
(but not open market) contracts. 
8 The price elasticity of demand ε,
(the percentage change in quantity
demanded that results from a 1-percent
change in price, in absolute value) is
the most common measure of price
sensitivity. In (2), out-of-pocket low-
income consumers are more price
sensitive than high-income consumers
at any given price regardless of
whether slopes or elasticities are used
to measure price sensitivity. For the
WIC model, with its Cournot-like
linear demand curves, group-specific
slopes are easier to discuss and
compare than are elasticities.
9 The own-price demand terms bL
and bH differ only between income
groups and not across brands. It was
thought that the econometric specifica-
tion in Oliveira et al. would be little
changed if the WIC model were to
specify own-price terms that differ by
both income group and by brand.
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promote that brand either through recommendations or the provision of
formula samples. Such promotions may lead to a brand-inducement
behavior by which the (representative) non-WIC household favors the
contract brand when making its out-of-pocket formula purchase. The model
does not require that all out-of-pocket households must behave this way, but
if some proportion of them do then u will be positive for the representative
household.10
A second, distinct effect occurs if (at least some) non-WIC households favor
the brand that has a greater presence on the supermarket shelf. Given that a
sole-source contract is in effect, and that WIC formula is estimated to
account for over half of infant formula sales, the contract brand is likely to
have more shelf space than the noncontract brand. This greater shelf space
may contribute, in itself, to greater sales to non-WIC households.11
The medical detailing and shelf-space effects are combined in the model to
form a single effect, u, which the model calls the tag-along effect. This
effect captures the extent to which the designation of brand 1 as the WIC
contract brand results in sales to non-WIC households that accompanies or
“tags along” with the sales to WIC households. The two components of the
tag-along effect were identified as theoretical possibilities for infant formula
demand by the U.S. Government Accounting Office (1998), which referred
to them as “spillover” effects. The tag-along effect is modeled as a one-for-
one tradeoff or substitution between the contract and noncontract brands.
The tag-along effect is zero (u = 0) if:
• consumers do not respond to additional medical promotion or shelf
space that the contract brand receives; or
• the contract brand does not receive additional medical promotion or
shelf space; or 
• there is no single contract brand, i.e., there is an open market contract or
if there is no rebate program in effect.
An interpretation of the brand-specific constants a1 and a2 in (2) is based on
considering consumption outcomes given that infant formula is free to
households (making P1 = P2 = 0) and given any of the conditions above that
make u = 0. Let z represent any household’s saturation level of formula, an
amount of formula beyond which a household would not consume (per unit
of time) even if formula were available to the household in unlimited quan-
tities for free.12 If there were but one brand of formula, say brand 1, then
that brand’s constant in (2a) would itself equal z. However, given that there
are two brands, then on average across households the consumption level z
would be divided based somehow on households’ non-price brand prefer-
ences, for which a1 and a2 are measures. Non-price brand preferences
reflect some combination of “innate” tastes, recommendations by doctors or
hospitals, and other non-price factors. If brand preferences are “symmetric,”
then for the representative household, a1 = a2 = a = z/2, in which case each
brand would be consumed by half of the households. More generally, the
share of total formula consumption in the market that brand k would receive
would be ak/(a1 + a2).
10
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10 Whether a manufacturer is the
contract or a noncontract brand in a
given area, the manufacturer has an
incentive to promote its brand in the
medical community so that doctors
and hospitals may recommend the
brand to patients. Some purchases by
some patients may be attributable to
this promotion activity, and such
behavior could be incorporated in the
WIC model through the demand-
specific constants a1 and a2. A rela-
tively successful medical promotion by
the manufacturer of brand 1 would,
other factors constant, be captured by
a1 > a2. The “medical promotion
effect” that is incorporated into u
specifically represents one-for-one
demand gains and losses between
brands that are attributable strictly to
whether or not a brand is designated
the contract brand in the area.
11 Empirical work on wine sales
(Folwell and Moberg, 1993) found that
“facings” (a measure of shelf space)
had an effect, separate from the effect
of price, on the quantities purchased of
wine. A study on juices (Brown and
Lee, 1996) found that the number of
facings affected the prices of juices. 
12 In fact, saturation levels would
differ across households due to physio-
logical differences of infants. The term
z can be thought of as the average
consumption of formula for the repre-
sentative household if formula were
free and unlimited.Demand of WIC Households  
In the absence of the WIC program, WIC households would be paying out
of pocket, in which case it will be assumed that their demand would
resemble the demand of out-of-pocket low-income households given in (2a)
and (2b). Under the WIC program, WIC households receive vouchers for a
fixed amount of formula (the WIC allocation). It will be assumed the WIC
allocation equals the saturation level z.13 The per-household demand curve
for brands 1 and 2 of supermarket formula for the W households in WIC is
given by:
where v represents the fraction of vouchers that a representative WIC house-
hold redeems in the supermarket sector (as opposed to other retail outlets), θk
represents the share of supermarket formula demand by a representative WIC
household that is provided by brand k; and δ is a zero-one dummy variable
signifying whether or not the WIC State agency uses the retail food delivery
system to distribute WIC formula. Each parameter is considered in turn. 
The term v reflects cross-sectoral substitution behavior of WIC households.
It is likely that the opportunity to substitute between supermarket formula
and discount store formula is important mainly for non-WIC households:
WIC households have no particular reason to seek out infant formula from
discount stores (which are assumed to be more distant and less convenient,
in general) because WIC households do not pay out of pocket for formula.
If WIC households simply obtain all of their formula in supermarkets (at the
same time they do grocery shopping), then v = 1. More generally, other
values for v allow changes in the presence of discount stores in a market
area to have some impact on WIC households.
Under sole-source WIC contracts, the term θk is a dummy variable: the
contract brand (brand 1) receives all of the formula demand of WIC house-
holds, making θ1 = 1, while θ2 = 0 for the noncontract brand (brand 2). In
contrast, a WIC household uses vouchers for the brand of its choice under
either open market contracts or under the counterfactual scenario in which
WIC has no rebate program at all. The WIC model assumes for these two
cases that θk in (2c) equals ak/(a1 + a2), the same values already identified
for out-of-pocket households when formula is free based on non-price brand
preferences. Regardless of the presence and type of contract, the brand-
share terms θ1 and θ2 sum to 1.
The dummy variable δ equals 1 if the WIC State agency uses the food
delivery distribution system to distribute WIC formula, and 0 otherwise. As
of September 2000, δ = 1 for all but two States.
A key feature of the specification in (2c) is that supermarket prices do not
appear in the expression. The formula demand of WIC households is
completely insensitive to price (perfectly inelastic) because the WIC
program—not the WIC household—pays for the formula. 
13 If, instead, the WIC allocation
were sufficiently close to zero, WIC
households would likely be willing to
pay the retail price (at least at suffi-
ciently low retail prices) to supplement
their relatively “small” allocation with
out-of-pocket purchases.  Because sup-
plementation is not considered to be a
widespread phenomenon, supplemen-
tation is excluded here by the assump-
tion the WIC allocation and the satura-
tion level are equivalent. 
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(2c)   1,2 qv z k k,W k == δθ ,Even though it may be reasonable to model the demand of any one WIC
household using (2c), overall WIC demand for all W households as a group
may not be price insensitive. Suppose retail price increases are not offset by
Congressional appropriations for WIC, and—despite WIC’s priority
system—some number of eligible infants are not able to participate in WIC
as a result. W then depends negatively on retail price and overall WIC
demand is price-sensitive. Nevertheless, even if overall WIC demand is not
perfectly inelastic, it is presumed that the degree of price sensitivity is suffi-
ciently low and/or the retail price at which these effects would be felt is
sufficiently high that this possibility can be neglected. At least to a first
approximation, it will be assumed that W is fixed and that overall WIC
demand is perfectly inelastic (at least within the relevant retail price range).
This assumption yields WIC-related price effects that are both mathemati-
cally tractable and relatively easy to interpret. Despite the inelastic specifi-
cation for WIC demand, any possibility of an infinite price/infinite profits
outcome is simply ruled out a priori.
Brand Demand for the Supermarket Sector
Summing (2a), (2b), and (2c) across market segments for each brand yields
two total demand equations given by:
where the market-level terms are aggregates of per-household terms given
by A1 = (H + L)a1, A2 = (H + L)a2, U = (H + L)u, S = (H + L)s, and B =
HbH + LbL. The term QW equals Wδvz, the market-level WIC demand for
all formula; the division of QW between brands depends on the brand-share
terms θ1 and θ2.
As in any model that involves aggregation of market segments, the location
of equilibrium in relation to the “kink” points of total market demand needs
to be addressed. It will be assumed that, in Nash equilibrium, supermarket
chains serve both out-of-pocket segments (rather than just the high-income
households alone). This assumption in effect stipulates that the equilibrium
price of each brand is sufficiently low that each brand’s equilibrium output
exceeds the output level of the kink point between the demands of the H and
L households. The possibility of serving only the WIC segment (an infinite
price/infinite profits outcome) was ruled out above. All three segments—L,
H, and W—are in fact served in the actual formula market, and that observed
outcome follows from the assumption that price is sufficiently low to serve
the L households. 
The assumption that bj > s for both L and H households was already
adopted for both economic plausibility and meaningfulness of the model’s
solution. The assumption implies that B > S in (3). 
As noted previously, one factor that affects supermarket price is the ease of
switching to formula sold in the discount store sector. Thus, bL and bH in
(2) and B in (3) may depend positively on the number of discount stores,
holding other factors constant—the price sensitivity of demand for super-
12
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θ
θmarket formula increases due to an increase in the number of discount
stores. However, a scaling factor is needed because market areas differ in
“size.” Oliveira et al. use the size of a market area’s total population as a
scaling factor. Thus, no effect on supermarket formula demand—and, in
turn, no effect on retailer’s profit-maximizing price—would be predicted if
one market area has double the number of discount stores of another but
also serves twice the population, making a “typical” discount store equally
convenient or accessible to the representative household in the two market
areas. Let D represent the ratio of the number of discount stores to total
population. An increase in D increases the price sensitivity of either out-of-
pocket segment and increases B in (3).
Another parameter in (3) that may be affected by D is v, the fraction of
vouchers that are redeemed in supermarkets (under the assumption that WIC
households consider the availability and convenience of discount stores
when making their plans for shopping trips). An increase in D is likely to
result in WIC households making larger overall expenditures in the discount
store sector, increasing voucher redemptions at discount stores and
decreasing v.
Finally, the size of the tag-along effect U is unlikely to be a simple constant
that is independent of any other factors. In particular, the amount of addi-
tional shelf space or medical promotion gained by a brand due strictly to its
status as the contract brand may depend largely on how much formula is
provided to WIC households. For simplicity, it will be assumed that under
the sole-source contract the tag-along effect is given by:
so that U is simply proportional to the amount of WIC formula.14
Solving (3a) and (3b) simultaneously, with (4), results in market demand
curves (inverse demand functions) once prices are expressed as functions of
quantities demanded:
where the derived parameters α1, α2, β, and γ are introduced to simplify
further development of the model. The assumption that bj > s means that 
B > S, which in turn implies that β and γ are each positive. 
If consumers exhibit no substitution behavior at all between brands, so that 
s = 0 at the household level, then S = 0 in (3), γ = 0 in (5), and each brand’s
demand curve becomes a function of the brand’s quantity only and is inde-
pendent of the quantity of the other brand.
14 It should be noted that the tag-
along effect may be influenced by the
distribution system. After all, there can
be no shelf-space effect for the
contract brand if WIC formula is not
distributed through the retail food
delivery system. On the other hand,
the medical promotion effect may
operate independently of the distribu-
tion channel. Rather than separating
out these influences, the model simply
assumes that the tag-along effect U
requires that distribution be conducted
through the retail food delivery system
(implicitly giving full weight to the
shelf-space effect, and none to the
medical promotion effect). 
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αβ γSolution of the WIC Model
The chain’s profit function for the two brands of infant formula (separate
from the other products offered by the chain) is:
For each of the M chains, the first-order conditions are15:
In contrast to the Cournot model, for which there is but one best response
function (BRF) for each firm, the WIC model’s two first-order conditions in
(7) each constitute a BRF. Each of the two BRFs exhibit two types of inter-
dependencies. As usual in a Cournot model, (7) exhibits cross-firm interde-
pendency for each given brand, i.e., the profit-maximizing level of a brand’s
output for a chain depends on the given levels of the brand’s output chosen
by the other chains. In addition, given cross-brand substitution behavior so
that γ > 0, each of the chain’s two BRFs exhibit cross-brand interdepend-
ency, i.e., the profit-maximizing level of output for a chain’s brand 1
depends on the firm’s own chosen level of output (and its rival’s chosen
levels of output) for brand 2, and vice versa. 
To solve in reduced form for the two optimal quantities of chain i,q 1i*and
q2i*, the BRFs must be solved for both cross-firm and cross-brand interac-
tions. As in a Cournot model in which all firms have identical constant
marginal costs, each chain’s quantity (for a given brand) is identical. Using
the result that the output of the (M – 1) rivals for chain i is simply (M –
1)qk,i , k = 1, 2, (7) becomes, in partially reduced form:
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15 The second-order conditions π11
i
< 0, π22




are met at the point at which the first-
order conditions are satisfied, given
typical assumptions about the magni-
tude of marginal cost relative to other
parameters (to exclude a corner solu-
tion of zero output). The solution to
(7) constitutes a local profit-maxi-
mizing set of output levels for the
chain. This local maximum will be the
focus of attention, since the infinite
price/infinite profits outcome was
already ruled out. 
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11Solving (8) simultaneously yields equilibrium quantities for the two brands
at the level of a chain:
Total production (in the market area) of either brand is the sum across (iden-
tical) chains of that brand’s output levels, which is simply M times greater
than the output of any one chain in (9). Equilibrium total production of each
brand can be written as:
where Y = H + L, the number of non-WIC households; w = W/Y, the ratio of
WIC to non-WIC households who buy formula; and b = B/Y, a weighted
average of the price-sensitivity parameters (slopes) of the two out-of-pocket
groups, which can be written as:
where the shares of H and L as proportions of all out-of-pocket consumers,
ωH and ωL, sum to 1.
Using (10) and (4), equilibrium market prices for brands 1 and 2 can be
expressed as functions of exogenous terms:
The assumption that b, the weighted average of the own-price terms,
exceeds s, the cross-price term, ensures that the denominators in (12) are
positive, which means prices for the contract and noncontract brands are
positive (given typical assumptions about the relative sizes of demand
parameters and marginal cost).
15












































































































































































⎟ =+ ωωResults of the WIC Model
An examination of (9), (10), and (12) shows whether equilibrium levels of a
chain’s quantities, the market quantities, and prices respond positively or
negatively to a change in any one factor, holding other factors constant. This
chapter focuses on price effects, although brief attention is given to quantity
effects. It is important to distinguish which price effects are due to WIC per
se as a government-funded formula-subsidizing program, which are due to
WIC’s rebate program, and which are due to sole-source procurement. 
The chapter begins by discussing price effects associated with changes in
marginal cost, price-independent brand preferences, and population. The
chapter continues with a discussion of price effects under two scenarios:
• the presence of the WIC program (without rebates) relative to the
absence of the WIC program;
• an increase in the relative size of WIC (without rebates).
The remainder of the chapter then considers each of the following WIC-
related factors in turn:
• an increase in the relative size of WIC if WIC has rebates generated by
open market contracts;
• the use of open market contracts relative to the absence of any rebate
contracts;
• an increase in the relative size of WIC if WIC has rebates generated by
sole-source contracts;
• the use of sole-source contracts relative to the use of open market con-
tracts;
• the use of sole-source contracts relative to the absence of the WIC pro-
gram; and
• the use of home delivery or direct distribution for distribution of WIC
formula relative to the use of the retail food delivery system.
A central variable of the WIC model is the relative size of WIC, w, meas-
ured by the ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-fed infants. A challenge in
reviewing price effects occurs because there is a multiplicative interaction in
(12) between w and its coefficient, which contains the parameters θ1, θ2, δ,
and h. Thus, the price effect due to a marginal increase in w depends on
whether WIC has a rebate program, whether the rebate program uses an
open market contract or sole-source procurement, and on the distribution
system used for WIC formula.16 In the end, it turns out that price effects are
easiest to consider by reviewing them in a particular sequence.
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16 An analogous mathematical
structure is found in the familiar
Distance-Speed-Time relationship D =
ST, where the multiplictative interac-
tions between S and T implies that the
Distance effect of a change in Speed
depends on the level of T and the
Distance effect of a change in Time
depends on the level of S. Effects of Marginal Cost, Brand Preferences,
and Population 
Marginal Cost. In (12), a brand’s price depends positively on the brand’s
own marginal cost. A second result of (12) is that a brand’s price does not
depend on the marginal cost of the competing brand, e.g., c2 is not a factor
that affects P1* (hereafter, the asterisk that denotes equilibrium values will
be implicit). However, that result depends on particular features of the WIC
model: a more general model may find that P1 is affected by c2 . A third
outcome of (12) is that its price-cost relationship matches precisely the
Cournot model’s price-cost relationship. Thus, the special features of the
WIC model that distinguish it from the Cournot model do not change the
role of marginal cost: in both models, a one-unit change in ck raises Pk by
M/(M+1). 
Econometric Specification of Wholesale Cost. A brand-specific retail price
regression in Oliveira et al. includes the brand’s wholesale cost as an inde-
pendent variable, since wholesale cost is a major determinant of marginal
cost. Furthermore, the price regression excludes the wholesale costs of other
brands. This econometric specification is restrictive in that, as noted above,
a more general theoretical model may find that in principle a brand’s retail
price may be affected by wholesale prices of other brands. The exclusion of
wholesale prices of other brands in the regressions is motivated less by the
results of the WIC model per se—although the WIC model identifies certain
conditions under which the specification is a correct one—and more by the
very high correlation between the wholesale prices of various manufac-
turers. Severe multicollinearity problems would be introduced in a retail
price regression if all wholesale prices were included in any one brand’s
regression. 
Although the WIC model, like the Cournot model, predicts that a price
regression’s coefficient on wholesale cost should be a positive fraction
equaling M/(M+1), that particular outcome depends strongly on the linear
demand specification used by the two models. Alternatively, a constant-elas-
ticity demand formulation cannot be ruled out as a possibility (although it
cannot be readily incorporated into the formal WIC or Cournot models), in
which case a regression coefficient on wholesale cost would exceed 1. In
summary, a price regression’s coefficient on wholesale cost is certainly
expected to be positive, though not necessarily fractional. 
Price-Independent Brand Preferences. Price-independent brand prefer-
ences are measured by ak, the constant term in demand in (1). An increase
in ak results in an increase in the brand’s retail price in (12). There is no
empirical measure for ak, and the term is simply absorbed by the constant in
a brand’s price regression. It is worth identifying ak as a distinct term in the
model even though it is not empirically measured because it is useful to
note that observed cross-brand variation in retail prices may be due in part
to unobserved cross-brand variation in ak.
Population Effects. The expressions in (10) and (12) exhibit a fundamental
structural difference: the number of non-WIC households, Y, is a compo-
nent of Qk but not of Pk. These results imply that the “scale” of demand—
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tion size—affects only Qk but not Pk. In other words, if the numbers of H, L,
and W households were to each increase proportionately, either over time or
relative to another market area, then Qk would increase by that same propor-
tion but Pk would remain unchanged. Given that infant formula can be sold
at a constant marginal cost (by assumption), variation in the size of a market
area does not affect equilibrium prices. 
Econometric Specification for Population. If a market area’s population
were to be included in a brand’s price regression, the coefficient is expected
to be statistically insignificantly different from zero. The sign of the vari-
able’s coefficient may be either positive or negative due to randomness in
the data, but no systematic (statistically significant) relationship is predicted
between price and population.
Effects of Relative Size of WIC,
Without Rebate Contracts
Two Price-Increasing Effects. In this section, let θk =  ak/(a1 + a2), δ = 1,
and h = 0. Two scenarios will be considered to examine price effects due to
WIC: w > 0 vs. w = 0, which compares the presence of WIC with the
absence of WIC; and a marginal increase in w. 
To keep the sequential discussion of the effects of WIC and the rebate
program organized, we temporarily assume that WIC does not have a rebate
program. This assumption is referred to as counterfactual since WIC
currently does have a rebate program; the assumption could just as well be
called an historical assumption since it describes WIC prior to the imple-
mentation of the rebate program. Examination of the counterfactual facili-
tates considering the effects of WIC, as a government-funded formula-
subsidizing program, prior to and separately from considering the effects of
WIC’s rebate program. In the absence of the infant formula rebate program,
it is supposed that all WIC formula is distributed using the retail food
delivery system, making δ = 1 in (12). 
Under the counterfactual, WIC households themselves choose whether to
redeem vouchers for brand 1 or for brand 2. As a result, θk in (12) is posi-
tive for both brands, equaling the value of ak/(a1 + a2) as noted earlier in the
section “Demand of WIC Households”. There is no tag-along effect under
the counterfactual, so h = 0 in (12). 
It is accurate to say that WIC “adds” to the overall market demands for
infant formula. After all, WIC provides vouchers to (low-income) house-
holds which those households use to obtain more formula than they would
have paid for if they were not WIC participants. However, given the
assumption of constant marginal cost, the price effect of WIC can not be
attributed to its role in increasing demand—whether the “scale” of demand
is small or large affects only Qk—but instead to WIC’s effect on the price
sensitivity of demand. Specifically, WIC decreases the price sensitivity of
demand in the overall infant formula market, which in turn increases the Pk
established by profit-maximizing supermarket chains. 
18
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identified in an analysis of WIC and the formula market by Salant (2003),
while another was identified by Post and Wubbenhorst (1989). 
Salant considered the behavior of a monopolistic infant formula manufac-
turer and examined major manufacturers’ wholesale price series. Based on a
“reservation price” monopoly model, Salant argued:
. . . by removing the portion of the population with the lowest reser-
vation price for infant formula from the general market, the WIC
program inevitably raised the profit-maximizing monopoly price . . .
What previously restrained [the monopolist] was the recognition
that a price increase would drive away the poorer customers; but
once the WIC program absorbs these customers, the monopolist has
nothing further to lose if he raises the price . . . As more infants are
added to the WIC program, the model predicts that the [monopolist]
will continue to raise the price to non-WIC customers. 
The pricing behavior identified by Salant does not require that the firm be a
monopolist or a manufacturer: his economic reasoning also applies to the
WIC model in which multiple supermarket chains engage in (imperfect)
competition in the establishment of a retail price. 
Salant’s argument that WIC “removes” from the general market the (low-
income) households with the lowest reservation price is recast by the WIC
model as the argument that WIC “removes” from the general market the
(low-income) households that are relatively more price sensitive (bL >
bH).17 Formally, let the numerical values of W, L, and H in the absence of
the WIC program (the counterfactual) be represented by W’, L’, and H’,
where W’=0 ,L’ =  L + W (the WIC households all fall below the model’s
income cutoff that demarcates low- from high-income households; see the
section “Demands of Out-of-Pocket Households”), and H’= H (the number
of high-income households is the same with or without WIC). The overall
price sensitivity of the out-of-pocket households is always a weighted
average of bL and bH, but the numerical value of that weighted average
depends critically on whether or not WIC is present. In the presence of
WIC, the numerical value of that weighted average is given by (11). Let b0
designate the value of the weighted average in the absence of WIC, where
Comparison of (13) and (11) shows that b0 > b. As WIC “removes” some
low-income households from the out-of-pocket segment of the market, the
mix of out-of-pocket households that remain is less price sensitive: the
weights on bL and bH are shifted more towards towards bH, lowering the
weighted average below b0. A decrease in the price sensitivity of out-of-
pocket households raises Pk in (12)—a result that will be established
formally below. Thus, holding other factors constant, each of the M super-
market chains will find it profit-maximizing to increase the retail price of
infant formula in the presence (versus the absence) of WIC. 
17 The WIC model, like Salant,
does not consider how in the absence
of WIC some of the low-income
households may choose breastfeeding
rather than purchase formula out of
pocket. 
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⎟We call this the out-of-pocket composition effect because the effect depends
on whether out-of-pocket demand is composed of relatively few or many
low-income households. Salant himself noted that this effect is analogous to
pricing effects that seem to be found in the markets for certain pharmaceu-
tical products. Prior to the introduction of generic pharmaceutical products
that are substitutes for brand-name products, it might have been predicted
that the entry of generic products would (as substitutes) lower the price of
the brand-name product due to the increase in “competition.” However, it
was observed that in some instances the price of the brand-name drug
increased after generic drugs entered the market. One explanation is that
those consumers who were most price sensitive switched to the generic
drug, leaving the less price sensitive (or so-called “brand-loyal”) customers
in the market for the brand-name product. In response to the decrease in
elasticity in demand facing its product, a profit-maximizing pharmaceutical
company will raise the price on its brand-name drug. 
Another mechanism by which WIC decreases the price sensitivity of
demand was identified by Post and Wubbenhorst. They argued that by
providing WIC households with vouchers, the WIC program produces a
“customer that is essentially unconcerned with the price she or he is
paying.” The WIC model calls this mechanism the voucher effect. In (12)
the voucher effect is present given that δ =1, in which case price is affected
by w through a mechanism other than the price-sensitivity term b. As w
increases from zero (in the absence of WIC) to a positive value (in the pres-
ence of WIC), the mix of demands in total market demand is changed, with
relatively fewer price-sensitive out-of-pocket households and relatively more
price-insensitive WIC households resulting in a decrease in overall price
sensitivity.18 The profit-maximizing supermarket chains respond to the
reduction in price sensitivity by raising the equilibrium retail prices of infant
formula when WIC is present.
Although the out-of-pocket composition effect and the voucher effect both
affect the mix of households in the infant formula market, the two are
different: the former changes the mix within the group of out-of-pocket
households while the latter changes the mix between the out-of-pocket
households and the WIC households.
The voucher effect reflects the WIC model’s general principle that the scale
of demand is unimportant. A change in the absolute size of WIC—whether
WIC is “big” or “small” as measured by W—does not necessarily change
price: if a change in W is accompanied by a proportionate change in Y, then
w is unchanged and price is unaffected. In contrast, a change in the relative
size of WIC, as measured by w, does affect price even if overall population
is fixed.
While WIC does “remove” a set of low-income households from the out-of-
pocket segment of the retail food system—as Salant emphasized—WIC also
provides vouchers that make WIC households price insensitive—as Post and
Wubbenhorst emphasized—which “adds” those same households back into
the retail food system. A way of describing both effects at once is to state that
WIC converts out-of-pocket low income households (whose price sensitivity
is greater than for high-income households) into WIC households (whose
price sensitivity—zero—is smaller than for high-income households).19
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18 The voucher effect is also a
particular type of “composition”
effect, involving the composition of
overall market demand and the rela-
tive numbers of WIC and non-WIC
households.
19 The concept of converting low-
income households from non-WIC to
WIC participation helps clarify how
there are two answers to the seemingly
simple question: “Are WIC households
more or less sensitive to price than
high-income households?” The answer
depends on whether the price sensi-
tivity of WIC households is considered
ex ante or ex post to their participation
in WIC.The discussion has introduced the out-of-pocket composition effect and the
voucher effect while considering the presence vs. the absence of WIC.
Similarly, an expansion of WIC—represented by a marginal increase in w—
would also increase price as a result of the same two mechanisms.
Effects of Relative Size of WIC, Formal Derivation. The formal derivation
of the price effects of changes in w focuses on P1 in (12a) and, for gener-
ality, does not here set zero values for particular parameters such as δ or h.
The total effect on price due to a change in w is given by:
As discussed earlier, the relative size of WIC affects prices through two mech-
anisms. These two mechanisms correspond to the voucher effect and the out-
of-pocket composition effect, respectively, which are represented by the first
term on the right in (14) and by the product of the final pair of terms.
The voucher effect is given by the partial effect of w on price, which is 
non-negative:
The voucher effect is strictly positive if δ = 1, i.e., if WIC formula is distrib-
uted using the retail food delivery system.
Examination of the out-of-pocket composition effect begins by identifying
the relationship between b and w, which can be expressed as
where b0 is the weighted average price sensitivity in the absence of any
WIC program from (13). Recalling that price sensitivity is relatively large
for low-income households (making bL > bH), an increase in w reduces b,
i.e., db/dw < 0. 
The remaining term in (14) represents the partial effect of b on price:
The value of the expression is negative whether δ equals 1 or zero and h is
zero or positive. Because db/dw < 0 and the partial effect of b on P1 is also
negative, the out-of-pocket composition effect is positive. If δ = 1 the
voucher effect and the out-of-pocket composition effect both work in the
same direction, making the total effect of w on P1 unambiguously positive.
21
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<If δ = 0, the effect of w on P1 remains positive due to the out-of-pocket
composition effect alone. 
Evaluation of the second derivative (not shown) demonstrates that P1 is
convex in w. For some analyses, such as behavior towards risk, the curva-
ture properties of a relationship between two variables is central. However,
in the graphical analysis below, the major results of the WIC model can be
portrayed most easily by treating the relationship between P1 and w as
approximately linear.
Graphical Illustration. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the
equilibrium price and w on the graphical line labeled PNR for “no rebate.”
When considering PNR, the variable Pk on the vertical axis can be thought of
simply as the equilibrium price of either brand in (12); the interpretations of
other graphical curves in Figure 1 are considered below. 
Along PNR all other price-determining factors besides w are held constant.
The slope of PNR measures the price effect on Pk due to a marginal change
in w. In general, the value of this price effect does depend on which brand is
considered (inasmuch as θk in (12) can be brand specific). 
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Retail prices vs. relative size of WIC under various contract systems




Ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-fed infants
*One relationship between price and w is labeled both PNR and POM, signifying that the 
same relationship exists whether no rebates are in effect or an open market contract is in 
effect (given that marginal cost of infant formula to supermarkets is held constant).
Source: Economic Research Service/USDA.The figure illustrates the price effects due to:
• the presence of the WIC program (under the counterfactual assumption
of no rebates) relative to the absence of the WIC program;
• an increase in the size of WIC  (under the counterfactual);
When considering the presence versus the absence of WIC, the relevant
change is from a zero value of w to a positive value, say wA. When consid-
ering an expansion of WIC, the relevant change is an increase in the value
of w, say from wA to wB. In either case, the change in w results in a retail
price increase. Of course, the magnitudes can differ, with a movement from
the intercept to point A in the former case and from point A to point B in
the latter case. However, the qualitative results—the direction of price
effects—are the same for both cases. 
Econometric Specification. The price regressions in the companion volume
contain three independent variables of particular interest:
• median household income (I), as a measure of central tendency of the
income distribution
• the poverty rate (R)
• the ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-fed infants (w).20
The regression includes I and R to capture the effects of differences across
out-of-pocket households of (income-dependent) price sensitivities and the
relative frequencies of out-of-pocket households at various income levels. 
As R increases, it is likely that the share of L out of all out-of-pocket house-
holds increases as well, increasing b in (11) and decreasing Pk. Although the
income cutoff for R is (by definition) the poverty line and the income cutoff
between the WIC model’s low- and high-income populations is set above
the income threshold at which a household qualifies for WIC (185 percent
of the poverty line), R is used in the companion volume as a rough proxy
for the overall shape of the income distribution within a market area.21 The
predicted sign for the regression coefficient on R is negative.
The inclusion of I in the price regression introduces an empirical element
that the WIC model has not fully considered. As a simplified theoretical
model, the WIC model sets but two values for price sensitivities, given by bH
and bL , and focuses on the mix of L and H households as the varying deter-
minant of the overall price sensitivity of the out-of-pocket households (in
(11)).22 However, in actual market areas, each household’s level of income
can vary, and each level of income may be associated with a particular value
of price sensitivity: instead of just two price-sensitivity values of bH and bL
there may instead be a range of many (unobserved) income-dependent
values. Thus, the many possible levels of household incomes and price sensi-
tivities and the frequency distribution of households together determine b,a
market area’s overall price sensitivity for out-of-pocket households. 
The variables R and I together capture, as effectively as can be done with
available data, the factors that influence b and the out-of-pocket composi-
20The same symbol w is used to
designate both this ratio (for the regres-
sion analysis) and the WIC model's
ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-buy-
ing households. Strictly speaking, the
two ratios do differ slightly to the
extent that a household may have more
than one formula-fed infant. 
21Although R and I are likely to be
(negatively) correlated, the inclusion
of R in the regression does not capture
how an area's low median household
income results in a low price: R can
only capture the role of income distri-
bution inasmuch as the regression also
contains I. If I were omitted, then the
coefficient on R would measure the
combined effects of low median
income and of income distribution. 
22These two values are set for any
given value of D, the ratio of discount
stores to population. As discussed, a
change in D does change the price
sensitivities to a new pair of values.
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w would measure a combination of the voucher effect and the out-of-pocket
composition effect. Because R and I are included in the regression, the
remaining role for w is to capture the voucher effect alone. 
Effects of Relative Size of WIC,
With Open Market Contract 
In this section, let θk =  ak/(a1 + a2), δ = 1, and h = 0. A marginal increase
in w is considered given that manufacturers pay rebates under an open
market contract.
The open market contract, even when it was in use, was never as predomi-
nant as the sole-source contract. Nevertheless, an open market contract is
considered prior to the sole-source contract in order to separate as fully as
possible the price effects of a rebate system from the price effects of a sole-
source contract. A key feature that distinguishes a rebate system under an
open market contract from a rebate system under a sole-source contract is
that the open market contracts generate rebates without affecting the relative
demands for different brands, while sole-source contracts channel all WIC
demand to a single contract brand. 
Under the open market contract, just as under the no-rebates counterfactual
already considered, WIC households choose whether to redeem vouchers for
either brand 1 or brand 2. Under the open market contract, θk in (12) are
positive for both brands, equaling the same values of ak/(a1 + a2) introduced
for the counterfactual. Because there is no single contract brand, the tag-
along effect remains zero (h = 0). Given these common specifications for
the values of θk and h, the value of the coefficient of w under the open
market contract matches the value of the coefficient under the counterfac-
tual, given by (14). Thus, the effect of a change in the relative size of WIC
is the same regardless of whether WIC has no rebate program or WIC has a
rebate program that uses open market contracts.
Effects of Open Market Contracts. In this section, let θk =  ak/(a1 + a2),
δ = 1, and h = 0. The effect of open market contracts per se is considered. 
It is important to distinguish between two different questions:
• What is the price effect of a change in the relative size of WIC if there is
an open market contract?
• What is the price effect of an open market contract (versus no open
market contract)?
The first question has already been answered, and the answer involves the
value of the slope of the relationship between Pk and w; the slope of the
relationship happens to be the same with or without an open market
contract. However, just because the slope is unaffected by the open market
contract does not mean that price is unaffected. Price can be affected by the
open market contract due to a change in:
• w, which changes the location of equilibrium price on a given curve; and
24
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Thus, even though the same terms appear in (12) whether the counterfactual
or open market contracts are considered, the values of two of the terms (w
and c) may depend on which of the two scenarios is considered. Initially,
marginal cost will be held constant, in which case any change in retail price
due to the open market contract occurs along the same PNR line associated
with the no-rebate counterfactual. It is for this case that Figure 1 relabels
PNR as POM for “open market” contract.
Under the counterfactual no-rebate assumption, WIC is financed by
Congressional appropriations alone. Suppose in this case that the relative
size of WIC is wA in Figure 1, with an equilibrium price of PA on the line
POM. Once rebates are received, suppose that Congress maintains the
amount of appropriations steady—so that rebates fully supplement those
appropriations—or that Congress lowers appropriations, but by less than the
amount of the rebates. Either way, total WIC funding grows and the WIC
program supports more participants.23 To the extent that more infants partic-
ipate in WIC as a result of the rebates, w increases (say to wB) and retail
price increases from PA to PB on POM, holding other factors (such as
marginal cost) constant.
In this scenario, when WIC receives rebates from open market contracts, the
relative size of WIC increases and price increases. Some analysts may there-
fore attribute the price increase to the rebates, concluding that the rebates
“caused” a retail price increase. However, other analysts might attribute the
price increase not to the rebate program per se but instead to the increase in
the relative size of WIC. This alternative way of describing the price
increase and its “cause” is based on the view that Congress can support any
particular size of WIC it chooses—be it wA or wB—either by appropriations
alone or by some mix of appropriations and rebates. In this view, Congress
can achieve any particular w with or without rebates, making the relative
size of WIC the only critical factor in determining retail prices. This view
considers the method of financing—the mix between appropriations and
rebates—to be important for budgetary considerations, but secondary (actu-
ally, ineffectual) in determining retail price at any given value for w. 
Throughout the rest of this report the WIC model treats wholesale prices as
exogenous, but here a relaxation of that assumption is considered. The
graphical curve POM depends in part on marginal cost, which in turn
depends on manufacturers’ wholesale price. If manufacturers increase
wholesale prices in response to the payment of rebates or to the relative size
of the WIC program (which itself can depend on rebates, as just noted), then
retailers’ marginal costs rise, which would increase retail prices. Noting that
marginal cost in (12) is a component of the intercept of POM in Figure 1, an
increase in marginal cost would shift POM parallel upwards (not shown). In
this case the lines POM and PNR would differ, and retail price would be
affected not only by any increase in w associated with rebates but also by
the upward shift in POM. Having identified this possible repercussion from
the rebate program on wholesale price, the remainder of this report returns
to concentrating on retailer behavior and again treats wholesale prices as
exogenous.
23An implicit assumption is that
there had been eligible households with
infants who are not participating in
WIC that would participate if additional
funding were available, so that an
increase in total WIC funding is indeed
associated with an increase in w.
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With Sole-Source Contract
In this section, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 0, δ = 1 and h = 0. Even though this section
examines sole-source contracts, which means there is a single contract
brand, the tag-along effect will be still be treated as zero; the tag-along
effect is examined separately below. 
There are four questions (each involving two prices) that will be answered
in this section and the following two sections:
• What are the effects on contract and noncontract brand prices due to an
increase in the relative size of WIC, given that a sole-source contract is
in effect?
• What are the effects on the prices of a national brand serving as either
the contract or noncontract brand as a result of changing from an open
market contract to a sole-source contract, at a given w?
• What are the effects on a national brand’s prices as it changes in contract
brand status?
• What are the effects on the prices of a national brand serving as either
the contract or noncontract brand as a result of changing from the
absence of WIC (and its rebate program) to the presence of WIC and a
sole-source contract?
Under the sole-source contract, the contract brand receives all of the WIC
demand, making θ1 = 1, while the noncontract brand receives none of the
WIC demand, making θ2 = 0. Given that δ = 1 and h = 0, (12) becomes:
Figure 2 makes a comparison of price curves for two different national
brands: the PCB and PNCB curves refer, respectively, to the curves for the
contract brand (e.g., Mead-Johnson) and the noncontract brand (e.g.,
Carnation). The figure shows that the intercept of PCB is above the intercept
of PNCB; the reverse is true for the intercept of the curve PNCB(c,a), which
will be considered below. Difference in intercepts could be due to a differ-
ence in non-price brand preferences, as measured by a1 and a2, to a differ-
ence in the marginal costs of the two brands, or both. 
In Figure 2, PCB has a positive slope, which reflects the coefficient on w in
(18a). Given that brand 1 receives all WIC demand, it is intuitive that an
increase in w results in an increase in P1. 
One might at first expect that an increase in the size of WIC will have no
effect on the price of the noncontract brand, which receives none of the
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−WIC demand (either before or after the increase in the relative size of WIC).
If there is no WIC-related price effect on the noncontract brand, its price
curve would be the (unlabelled) horizontal dashed line. What is perhaps
unexpected is that the price curve for the noncontract brand is given by
PNCB, which lies above the horizontal line. According to (18b) and its
graphical illustration as PNCB, an increase in the relative size of WIC results
in an increase in the price of the noncontract brand P2.
The mechanism by which w affects the price of the noncontract brand is
through the demand substitution behavior of the non-WIC households. An
increase in w results in profit-maximizing supermarket chains establishing a
higher P1 along PCB, and (at least some) non-WIC households respond to
this increase in the price of brand 1 by switching demand to brand 2 (strictly
speaking, the price sensitivity of demand for brand 2 must be affected, not
merely the scale or size of demand). Supermarket chains respond to the
change in the demand for brand 2—which was caused by their very own
increase P1  in the first place—by increasing P2.24
As mentioned previously, one of the powerful features of the WIC model is
that it permits (but does not require) substitution behavior between brands.
In (2), the parameter that captures the extent to which non-WIC households
substitute between brands within the supermarket sector is s, which appears
in the numerator in (18b). If non-WIC households do not substitute at all
between the brands, then s = 0 in (18b) and the price curve for the noncon-
24If a nonequilibrium situation were
being examined, the increase in the
price of brand 2 would result in (at
least some) non-WIC consumers
switching to brand 1, resulting in
nudge up in the price of brand 1 and a
nudge down in the price of brand 2,
which would result in a further chain
of effects between the prices of the
two brands (with each link in the chain
growing progressively smaller).
However, an advantage of the formal
mathematical approach used by the
WIC model is that it examines the
equilibrium outcome of that entire
process (through the simultanteous
determination of the prices of the two
brands), so that the entire sequence or
chain of interactions between the two
brands results in a final outcome that
is portrayed in (14) and Figure 2. The
changes in the equilibrium prices P1
and P2 already take into account all
the interactions.
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Figure 2
Retail prices vs. relative size of WIC for two national brands
Equilibrium supermarket price of Brand K
PCB
PNCB
Ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-fed infants
Source: Economic Research Service/USDA.
PNCB(c,a)tract brand would be represented by the dashed horizontal line. The PNCB
curve in Figure 2 assumes that s > 0. This report adopts that assumption
hereafter. The econometric analysis in Oliveira et al. subjects this assump-
tion to a statistical test. 
There is a difference between the positive slopes of PCB and PNCB because b
appears in (18a) and s appears in (18b). The closer s is to b—the better
brand 2 can substitute for brand 1—the closer PNCB comes to being parallel
to PCB, making the price effect of w on the contract and noncontract brands
more similar. The WIC model stipulated that b > s, making PCB steeper than
PNCB. 
Figure 2 illustrates one additional curve labeled PNCB(c,a), where the nota-
tion emphasizes how marginal cost and non-price brand preferences affect
the location of the price curve. In contrast to PNCB,P NCB(c,a) is located
above rather than below PCB. As price curves for a noncontract brand,
PNCB(c,a) and PNCB share a common slope (which is exceeded by the slope
of PCB). Figure 2 shows the price effect due to a change in w is greater for
the contract brand than for the noncontract brand regardless of whether the
contract brand’s retail price is high or low relative to the noncontract brand’s
retail price (i.e., regardless of whether the noncontract brand’s price lies on
PNCB(c,a) or PNCB). 
Oliveira et al. found that, within market areas, there is not a clear and
consistent relationship between a formula’s being the WIC contract brand
and that formula being sold at the highest average retail price. However,
comparing the retail prices of contract and noncontract brands of formula
does not necessarily identify WIC-related price effects since other factors
may affect retail prices. Retail prices of two national brands do reflect the
relative size of WIC and which of the two national brands holds the rebate
contract. But retail prices also reflect non-price brand preferences and
marginal cost. While non-price brand preferences are not measured empiri-
cally, differences across national brands in wholesale prices are measurable.
A comparison of PCB and PNCB shows how a particular national brand can
be the contract brand in a market area and have a higher retail price than a
noncontract brand due to a relatively high wholesale price for the contract
brand. In contrast, the expectation that the contract brand has the highest
retail price would not be met if PCB is compared with PNCB(c,a). Due to a
relatively low wholesale price, a national brand associated with PCB has a
retail price below the noncontract brand price on PNCB(c,a). The empirical
analysis in Oliveira et al. is designed to separate the retail price effects due
to contract brand status from the effects due to wholesale prices. 
Contract Systems, Contract Brand Effects,
and Distribution Systems
Effects of Sole-Source Contracts Compared With Open Market Contracts.
In this section, δ = 1 and h = 0 and a comparison is made between (θ1, θ2) =
(1, 0) and θk = ak/(a1 + a2).
This section begins with a comparison of retail prices under a sole-source
contract with retail prices under an open market contract. A key difference
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between brands 1 and 2 or if WIC households must purchase a single
contract brand.25 Then the section examines how retail prices compare
between a sole-source contract and the absence of the WIC program. 
Returning to Figure 1, the curves PCB and PNCB straddle the curve POM,
radiating from the same intercept. Now the interpretation of Figure 1 is that
it applies to any single national brand under varying conditions. Under an
open market contract, the retail price of the national brand is at point B,
given wB. Suppose that a sole-source contract is adopted instead of an open
market contract, and the national brand is awarded the rebate contract. The
price effect of a sole-source contract for the contract brand, relative to an
open market contract, is to increase retail price from point B to point C. The
reason for this price increase is not due to a “rebate system” per se: the
open market contract also generates rebates. Instead, the movement from
point B to point C is because the share of WIC demand received by the
given national brand increases from a fraction, given by ak/(a1 + a2) under
the open market contract, to 100 percent.
Suppose instead that a sole-source contract is adopted instead of an open
market contract, and the national brand is not awarded the rebate contract,
becoming the noncontract brand. The price effect of a sole-source contract
for the noncontract brand, relative to an open market contract, is to decrease
the retail price from point B to point D. The reason for this price decrease
for the noncontract brand is that its share of WIC demand drops from a frac-
tion (under the open market contract) to 0 percent. Even though the national
brand loses its fractional share of WIC demand, its retail price does not drop
from point B to the dashed horizontal line at point E. The demand substitu-
tion from the contract brand to the noncontract brand exhibited by non-WIC
households helps sustain the retail price of the noncontract brand, making
the decrease in its retail price smaller than would be the case if there were
no substitution behavior.
Effects of Contract Brand Status. In this section, δ = 1 and h = 0 and a
comparison is made between θk = 0 and θk = 1 for a given manufacturer’s
brand.
Given that a sole-source contract is in effect, the price effect for a national
brand changing status from noncontract to contract is represented by a move
from point D to point B; alternatively, the move from point B to point D
represents the price effect of changing status from contract to noncontract.
These changes are the price effect of a change in contract brand status. The
price effect of contract brand status depends on the relative size of WIC. If
w is small, the contract brand status makes little difference in a national
brand’s retail price, whereas if w is large, the change from contract to
noncontract status—from having all of the WIC demand to having none of
the WIC demand—results in a large price effect.
25A second difference between
open market and sole-source contracts
can be important in practice. Although
both types of contracts generate
rebates, historically the amount of
rebates obtained from a sole-source
contract is larger than the amount from
an open market contract. This differ-
ence in turn could affect w and there-
fore retail prices. However, since the
theoretical effects of rebates were
already identified in the discussion of
the open market contracts, it will be
assumed hereafter that the rebate lev-
els of the open market and sole-source
contracts are the same. This assump-
tion is adopted to concentrate on the
effect that results from channeling all
WIC demand to a single contract
brand, holding other factors constant.
The size of the differences in rebates
may be of great importance in a practi-
cal comparison between the two types
of contracts. 
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this section, let (θ1, θ2) = (1, 0), δ = 1, and h = 0.
The answer to a simple question such as “What are the price effects of sole-
source contracts?” depends on what conditions are being compared with the
sole-source contracts. One alternative condition to a sole-source contract,
considered above, is an open market contract. This section examines a
condition in which WIC and its rebate program are absent.
Figure 1 shows that in the absence of WIC w is 0, resulting in a retail price
of the national brand at the intercept or, equivalently, at point E. If the WIC
program is adopted and a sole-source contract is used, the effect on the
retail price of the national brand depends of course on whether the national
brand is awarded the WIC contract or not. Retail price increases from E to
C for the contract brand, while retail price increases only from E to D for
the noncontract brand.
In this section, the price effect of a sole-source contract—compared with the
absence of WIC—is to increase the retail price of formula for both the
contract (E to C) and noncontract brands (E to D). As previously noted, the
price effect of a sole-source contract—compared with an open market
contract—is to increase the retail price of the contract brand (B to C) and
decrease the retail price of the noncontract brand (B to D). The seemingly
simple question “What are the price effects of using a sole-source contract?”
results in two answers that have different magnitudes and even different
signs. This is but an example of the general principle that it is important to
identify the alternative condition when investing the theoretical or empirical
effect of a change in policy, economic, or demographic variables. 
Tag-Along Effect. In this section, let (θ1, θ2) = (1, 0) and δ = 1. A compar-
ison is made between h = 0 and h > 0.
The tag-along effect, the composite of the medical promotion effect and the
shelf-space effect, represents certain demand-shifting behaviors that favor
the contract brand at the expense of the noncontract brand. Reintroducing a
positive h shows that the tag-along effect enhances the positive effect w has
on the contract brand’s P1, entering the numerator of (18a) positively, but
(partially) offsets the positive effect w has on the noncontract brand’s price
P2, entering the numerator of (18b) negatively. 
Qualitatively, Figure 1 is not affected the tag-along effect. If the tag-along
effect is present, the price effect of a change in w is greater for the contract
brand and smaller for the noncontract brand, creating a gap in Figure 1
between the PCB and PNCB curves that widens more quickly.
The price regressions in Oliveira et al. have no separate measure for the tag-
along effect, which is simply treated as a fixed parameter and absorbed into
the regression coefficients on w.
Alternative Distribution Systems. In this section, a comparison is made
between δ = 0 and δ = 1, given that θ1 = 1 and θ2 = 0.
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distribute WIC formula, WIC consumers obtain formula either by the direct
distribution system (as in Mississippi) or the home distribution system (as in
Vermont). Alternative distribution systems involve contracts between State
WIC agencies and manufacturers but the contracts do not, strictly speaking,
involve rebates from manufacturers. Instead, State WIC agencies purchase
directly from the manufacturer. Nevertheless, direct distribution and home
distribution strongly resemble a rebate system in that they are all designed
for cost-containment. 
Under direct distribution or home distribution, a marginal change in the
relative size of WIC (or the presence of WIC vs. the absence of WIC)
increases retail prices due to the out-of-pocket composition effect alone,
which operates through changes in b. WIC “removes” low-income house-
holds from the general market, but the voucher effect is absent because WIC
does not “add” these same WIC households back into the retail food
delivery system. In this case, δ = 0 in (12), canceling the term that contains
w explicitly, and setting the partial derivative in (15) to 0. The out-of-pocket
composition effect is still positive, but because the voucher effect does not
augment it, the retail price is lower than it would be if the retail food
delivery system were used, holding other factors constant.26
The empirical analysis in Oliveira et al. focuses on price data from market
areas in which the retail food delivery system is used.
Effect of Market Structure Conditions
Discount Stores. Another factor that affects retail price is a household’s
ability to buy formula at discount stores. It was discussed earlier how an
increase in D, the ratio of the number of discount stores to total population,
can be expected to increase the price sensitivity of demand for supermarket
formula, as measured by b. An increase in b, in turn, decreases Pk. In addi-
tion, an increase in D and the convenience of discount stores to WIC house-
holds may lower v, the fraction of formula WIC households receive in
supermarkets, thus decreasing Pk further.
Concentration (M). An increase in M, the number of (equally sized) firms,
lowers concentration whether concentration is measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, the four-firm concentration ratio, or any other measure of
concentration. As in the Cournot model, if M = 1, the result in the WIC
model is a monopoly outcome (although here it is an outcome associated
with one monopoly supermarket chain pricing two interdependent brands).
As M increases without limit, concentration falls, market output and price
approach the outcome of a perfectly competitive market in which price
equals marginal cost (for each brand). Thus, in the WIC model an increase
in M is associated with a decrease in price (for each brand), just as in the
Cournot model.
Oliveira et al. considers how an increase in concentration may be associated
with a decrease (rather than an increase) in the retail price of infant formula,
but that discussion lies outside the scope of this report.
26While it might be thought that a
lower retail price is desirable (from a
consumers' perspective), a State that
uses direct distribution or home distri-
bution bears the administration costs
of operating the State's formula distri-
bution system, and such costs must be
funded somehow.  An assessment of
the many pros and cons of adopting
alternative distribution systems is
beyond the scope of this report.
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i,t represents the retail price of brand k formula in market area i in time
period t;
•C B k
i,t represents a dummy variable that equals 1 if brand k is the
contract brand in market area i in time period t and equals zero 
otherwise;
•w i,t represents the ratio of WIC to non-WIC formula-fed infants in
market area i in time period t;
•W C k
t represents the wholesale cost for brand k in time period t;
•D i,t represents the number of discount stores relative to population in
market area i in time period t;
• HHIi represents the M-firm Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for market area
i in 2000;
•I i,t represents median household income in market area i in time period t;
•R i,t represents the poverty rate for market area i in time period t;
• εi,t represents an error term
It is expected that β1 > 0, measuring the price effect on the contract brand of
a change in w, and that β2 > 0, measuring the price effect on the noncontract
brand of a change in w. It is also expected that β3 > 0, β4 < 0, β5 > 0 (based
on the WIC and Cournot models), β6 > 0, and β7 < 0. 
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M the number of supermarket chains in a local market area 
ck marginal cost to the supermarket chain for formula brand k
(k = 1, 2) 
Ck,i total cost of brand k (k = 1, 2) for chain i (i = 1,...,M) 
qk,i quantity of brand k formula sold by chain i (i = 1, ..., M) 
N the number of households in a local market area that use formula 
H high-income households, used to represent both their number and
their type 
L low-income households, used to represent both their number and
their type 
qk,j quantity demanded for brand k formula (k = 1, 2) by type j house-
holds (j = L, H) 
Pk supermarket price for brand k formula (k = 1, 2) 
ak price-independent demand parameter (intercept) for brand k
formula
u demand parameter that measures the tag-along effect 
bj own-price demand parameter (slope) for type j households (j = L,
H) 
s cross-price demand parameter 
z a household’s saturation level of formula (and the WIC allocation) 
qk,W quantity demanded for brand k formula (k = 1, 2) by WIC house-
holds 
v the fraction of vouchers that a representative WIC household
redeems in supermarkets 
θk the share of supermarket formula demand by a representative WIC
household that is provided by brand k formula (k = 1, 2) 
δ dummy variable that equals 1 if WIC formula is distributed
through the food delivery distribution system and zero otherwise 
Qk Market demand for the supermarket sector for brand k formula 
(k = 1, 2)  
Ak market-level term equaling (H + L)ak
U  market-level term equaling (H + L)u 
B  market-level term equaling HbH + LbL
S  market-level term equaling (H + L)s 
QW market-level WIC demand for all formula
D the ratio of the number of discount stores to total population 
h a constant of proportionality relating U to QW
α a derived parameter 
β a derived parameter 
γ derived parameter 
Y the number of non-WIC households 
w the ratio of WIC to non-WIC households that buy formula 
b the group-weighted average of price sensitivity terms bH and bL,i f
WIC is present 
b0 the group-weighted average of price sensitivity terms bH and bL,i f
WIC is absent 
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